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Abstract China has been frequently and heavily affected 
by drought disasters. During 2009–2010, three large-scale 
severe droughts struck China, caused considerable social, 
economic, and ecological losses. These droughts showed sig-
nificant regional differences. This study employs a two-stage 
transition framework comprising “entry” and “exit” transitions 
to discuss disaster risk management of drought in China, 
by taking the three droughts as comparative case studies. 
Chinese society’s response in the exit transition is examined 
and the underlying factors that enable the entry trigger are 
diagnosed. The policy responses that lead to the exit transition 
from these drought disasters were appropriate, but there is 
substantial room for improvement in management strategy 
regarding both entry and exit transitions. This article suggests 
that government policies should emphasize entry-prevention 
measures that reduce adverse impacts early in a drought 
episode rather than focus solely on improving performance in 
achieving a rapid exit transition from drought. 
Keywords China, disaster entry transition, disaster exit 
transition, drought disasters
1 Introduction
Throughout its history, China has experienced frequent and 
serious drought disasters. Drought is believed to be the major 
cause of a 40 percent drop in China’s population in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Wakeman 1985; Temple 
2002) and to have been a significant driving variable that led 
to the collapse of the Ming Dynasty (Shen et al. 2007). Since 
1949, droughts have accounted for nearly 35 percent of 
annual agricultural losses caused by all natural disasters 
in China (Song et al. 2003). Each year, tens of millions of 
hectares of crops suffer from yield loss because of drought 
(Wu and Gao 2009). Drought has been a particularly difficult 
challenge in China’s management of natural disaster risks 
because it is an insidious, slowly developing hazard that 
creeps stealthily upon society rather than striking suddenly 
and violently.
From January 2009 to April 2010, China endured three 
severe drought episodes. The intensity of the meteorological 
drought in each of the three disasters reached the once in 
every 100 year level. The droughts affected vast areas and 
lasted for comparatively long periods. Thus these droughts 
severely affected the regional socioeconomic systems of the 
impacted areas. Millions of people and livestock had diffi-
culty accessing drinking water, the survival of tens of millions 
of hectares of crops was placed at risk, and a profound, 
long-term impact was imposed on the economy, society, and 
ecological environment. Chinese society mobilized consider-
able resources to relieve the impacts, under a highly central-
ized system as usual, with direct leadership from the central 
government. The response to each drought was essentially 
successful in terms of saving lives and ensuring local food 
security and social stability. Nevertheless, many issues are in 
need of discussion if the next step is to shift China’s drought 
disaster risk management from a crisis response approach to 
a risk management approach. 
This article discusses the issues of drought disaster risk 
management in China on the basis of comparative case 
studies of the three severe drought disasters between 2009 
and 2010. The key question to address is: what are the critical 
factors that eased China’s “entry” into a drought disaster state 
and hindered its “exit” from the disaster state to a normal 
state? Diagnostic studies of these issues can provide an 
overview of the status quo of China’s drought disasters and 
its management. After presenting the method and data used 
in the diagnostic comparative case study, we provide an over-
view of the three drought disasters. This review includes 
analysis of the hazards and their impacts, and then summa-
rizes and evaluates the actions of Chinese society in the exit 
transition. Experience and lessons learned for improvement 
of response actions in the exit transition are highlighted. 
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Drought entry issues are then investigated, and cross-event 
comparisons are used to reveal regional differences. On the 
basis of these analyses, policy recommendations are made to 
the Chinese government. 
2 Method and Data
In this study, the conceptual framework of disaster entry and 
exit transition analysis is employed. This structure was devel-
oped by the International Human Dimensions Programme 
on Global Environmental Change core project on Integrated 
Risk Governance (IHDP-IRG 2009). In this conceptual 
framework, the disaster entry transition refers to the process 
and mechanisms by which a given social-ecological system 
switches into emergency or crisis mode (for example, in 
dealing with a hurricane or financial collapse), while an exit 
transition refers to situations in which the corresponding 
system switches back from emergency or crisis mode, to a 
more normal mode. The conditions that prevail in this 
reversion to greater normalcy may or may not reflect the same 
system state that existed before the crisis. 
The transition from natural hazards to natural disasters is a 
typical process of human-nature interaction, and there have 
been several conceptual frameworks developed to capture 
this shift experience. For instance, the well-known pressure 
and release (PAR) model conceptualizes disasters as the result 
of interaction between hazards and vulnerability (Wisner 
2004). Similarly, regional disaster system theory considers 
natural disasters as the outcome of interactions between 
regional (mainly natural) environment, natural hazards that 
form in that environment, and the social-ecological system 
(SES) that is exposed to risk (Shi 1996). 
The transition framework builds on these natural hazard 
models and work on the social amplification of risk 
(Kasperson et al. 1988; Kasperson and Kasperson 1996; 
Lofstedt and Renn 1997; Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 
2003). A robust SES may have a high threshold of entry; 
that is, a disaster may not be easily triggered by hazards. For 
instance, a region where buildings and infrastructure are 
commonly reinforced may not suffer any loss should there be 
a magnitude 5 earthquake. However, in the case of a less 
resilient SES, an entry transition can be easily triggered, the 
region can suffer heavily, and there may be no self-organized 
exit transition. The Haiti earthquake is a typical example of 
this more vulnerable case. 
The essential motivation for undertaking the transition 
study is to reveal the processes and mechanisms by which a 
social-ecological system enters and leaves the “disaster” state. 
The transition study tries to answer questions such as when 
do the entry and exit transitions begin? What are the critical 
factors that trigger entry and exit transitions? How would 
entry and exit transitions be altered should the SES change? 
Policies regarding risk management can benefit from 
these answers. In a certain sense, the transition framework 
resembles an integration of vulnerability and resilience 
studies. But the transition framework focuses more on the 
interaction processes rather than the static characteristics 
of the SES. It is particularly concerned about the dynamic 
transformation of the system (including the dynamic updating 
of coping capacity) when there is movement between differ-
ent system states. The preliminary phase of an entry and exit 
transition study is to identify the key factors, having either 
positive or negative impacts, in the process of transition into 
and out of the disaster state. Diagnostic study is important in 
this phase to understand why a disaster happens and how a 
certain pattern of loss forms. The advanced phase is expected 
to model the transitions, with either dynamic models or 
complex system models. The entry and exit transitions are 
then formulated with partial differential equations (or other 
mathematical forms) and the state of the system is described 
accordingly. 
This article is a preliminary application of the transition 
framework to the study of drought risk management. It em-
ploys a diagnostic approach that has three stages: (1) analysis 
of the transition from hazard to disaster so as to understand 
how impacts occur; (2) analysis of the exit transition to evalu-
ate society’s response and identify areas for improvement; 
and (3) analysis of larger contextual issues that ease the entry 
transition. To provide some necessary insights, two compara-
tive analyses are conducted in the study. The first comparison 
is made between the full impact of drought at its peak and 
the final loss (social, economic, and ecological) claimed, 
by which the overall effect of the exit response is evaluated 
and positive and negative factors in the exit transition are 
identified. The second comparison is a cross-event/region 
comparison to determine the regional characteristics that 
ease the entry transition, since the three droughts occurred in 
different parts of China.
This study uses a wide range of data. Officially released 
meteorological information, impact and loss statistics, and 
information on drought-mitigation activities were collected 
from the websites of the China Meteorological Administra-
tion (CMA), State Flood Control and Drought Relief Head-
quarters (SFDH), and National Disaster Reduction Center of 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs (NDRC-MCA). These data are 
basically released daily or weekly, depending on the severity 
of the drought at the time. Quarterly or annual statistical data 
were obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBSC). The study also employs field survey data collected 
by the authors on field surveys organized by the Expert Panel 
of the National Disaster Reduction Committee of China 
(EP-NDRCC). The survey data allow deeper insights into 
socioeconomic life and particularly mitigation activities in 
local villages that were not revealed by the statistical data. 
These data serve the purpose of the study well and are highly 
credible as they were originally acquired to determine the 
cause and impact of drought and make policy recommenda-
tions to the NDRCC and the State Council. 
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3 The 2009–2010 Drought Disasters in 
China: Overview
There were three intensive meteorological droughts in the 
2009–2010 period: in late 2008 and early 2009 (hereinafter 
referred to as the 2009 spring drought), the summer of 2009 
(the 2009 summer drought), and September 2009 to early 
2010 (the 2010 spring drought). The name of each drought 
relates to the season of the most severe impact. Since it is dif-
ficult to present the dynamics of the chronic events, Figure 1 
provides snapshots of the spatial patterns of the three droughts. 
Basic features of each drought are listed in Table 1. 
In the 2009 spring drought, the rainfall in the affected 
regions was generally 50–80 percent lower than in the 
corresponding period of a normal year. Hebei Province had 
the lowest rainfall for the corresponding period since 1951 
and it was the third lowest in Henan Province (China 
National Climate Center 2009a). In early February 2009, the 
drought reached its peak, with the main affected places in the 
major winter wheat producing areas of the Yellow River, Huai 
River, and Hai River plains. 
During the 2009 summer drought, from June to 15 August, 
the rainfall in the affected regions was 30–80 percent lower 
than in the corresponding period of a normal year. The aver-
age rainfall for Liaoning, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and 
Shanxi was only 127.6 mm, the lowest for the corresponding 
period since 1951 (China National Climate Center 2009b). 
Starting from early September 2009, the rainfall in south-
western China was below normal. In the following months, 
Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqing, and eastern 
Tibet had high temperature and little rainfall. From 1 Septem-
ber 2009 to 23 February 2010, the average rainfall in Yunnan 
Figure 1. Snapshots of the spatial pattern of the 2009–2010 severe droughts in China
Abbreviations: HLJ—Heilongjiang Province; JL—Jilin Province; IM—Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; LN—Liaoning Province; BJ—Beijing Municipality; 
TJ—Tianjin Municipality; HB—Hebei Province; SHD—Shandong Province; SHX—Shanxi Province; SHAX—Shaanxi Province; HN—Henan Province; 
AH—Anhui Province; JS—Jiangsu Province; CHQ—Chongqing Municipality; SC—Sichuan Province; GZH—Guizhou Province; YN—Yunnan Province; 
GX—Guangxi Province. 
Data source: China National Climate Center 2009–2010.
Table 1. Basic features of the 2009–2010 severe droughts in China
Features 2009 spring droughta 2009 summer droughtb 2010 spring droughtc
Starting Mid-Nov. 2008 End-Jun. 2009 Early-Sep. 2009
Ending End-Feb. 2009 Early-Nov. 2009 Early-May 2010
Duration 3 months 5 months 6 months
Peak date of the drought 7 Feb. 2009 16 Aug. 2009 –
Major areas affected The major producing area for winter wheat, 
including HN, AH, SHD, JS, SHX, HB, and GS
Southeast IM, north SHX, north HB 
and LN, southwest JL and HLJ
GX, YN, GZH, SC, and CHQ
Meteorological cause Relatively high temperature and low precipitation Low precipitation High temperature and low 
precipitation
Return period 30–50 a 50–100 a 50–100 a
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Province was 163.3 mm, the lowest since 1952. Meanwhile, 
the average temperature in the province was 15.1°C, the 
highest since 1952 (China National Climate Center 2010).
3.1 Drought Impact
The three drought disasters greatly affected regional 
socioeconomic life in the stricken provinces. The impacts are 
summarized in Table 2. The major impact categories listed in 
daily official release of impact and statistical data include the 
affected crops, people, and livestock. The area of crops and 
numbers of people and livestock affected are regarded as 
a proxy of the overall severity of droughts. For people and 
livestock, the primary concern is whether they have access to 
a steady and continuous supply of drinking water. “Difficulty 
in access to drinking water” is an indicator always used to 
describe drought impact in China. According to the national 
standard, difficulty in access to drinking water refers to the 
case that the distance to a water source (supply point) exceeds 
1000 m (one way) or there is a 100-m difference in elevation, 
or rural areas are without rainfall for more than 100 days. For 
crops, potential yield loss is the focus due to its significance 
to feeding the Chinese population. Further information 
about the situations in the affected regions is provided in the 
following section. 
3.1.1 Direct Impacts of the Droughts
During the droughts, many local people had difficulty access-
ing drinking water because their regular water supply became 
unavailable. Those people mainly resided in areas with scarce 
water resources, hilly/mountainous areas, and rural areas far 
from cities and towns (NDRC-MCA 2009a). Most had to 
travel miles to get water to meet the most basic living require-
ments. There was little water for washing and bathing, and 
water for agriculture and industry was basically unavailable.
The 2009 spring drought threatened the production of 
winter wheat. The 2009 summer drought mainly affected 
crops to be harvested in the autumn. The 2010 spring drought 
was long lasting, covering almost the entire growth period of 
winter crops in southwestern China. Each drought introduced 
uncertainty into China’s food grain availability and there were 
moderate temporary fluctuations in the market price when the 
droughts emerged (Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange 2009). 
Cash crops in the drought affected provinces also suffered 
heavy losses, such as tree fruits (EP-NDRCC 2009b), peren-
nial sugar cane, coffee, walnut, and medicinal and oil crops 
(EP-NDRCC 2010). In Yunnan Province, 200,000 ha of cash 
crops were moderately affected, with one fifth of that without 
any harvest. There were two major direct effects of drought 
on animal husbandry: the lack of drinking water and declined 
supply of foraging grass. By 10 August 2009, 200,000 live-
stock in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region had died due 
to the drought (EP-NDRCC 2009b). Furthermore, silkworm 
breeding, as one of the most well-known industries of Yunnan 
Province, suffered heavy losses (EP-NDRCC 2010).
With the reduced outputs of agriculture and the livestock 
industry, the food processing industry was also affected 
because of an inadequate input of raw materials, such as 
sugar, coffee, silkworm, tea, tobacco, and oil products. A 
reduction in sugar production of 400,000 tons was estimated 
for Yunnan Province alone, which corresponds to an economi c 
loss of about RMB 2 billion Yuan (EP-NDRCC 2010; China 
Daily 2010a).
Droughts also dried up some rivers and suspended elec-
tricity generation at some hydropower plants in southwestern 
China (EP-NDRCC 2010). In some areas of Inner Mongolia 
and Yunnan Province, drought resulted in the wide spread of 
pests. The report of the 2010 field survey showed that the area 
of forest suffered from diseases and pests was 137,000 ha, 
70.7 percent larger than that of the same period in 2009 
(EP-NDRCC 2010). It also triggered secondary impacts that 
are shown in the following section. 
3.1.2 Indirect Social and Economic Impacts 
In the 2009 summer drought and 2010 spring drought, rural 
communities of the heavily affected areas faced a particularly 
poor food security situation. Local farmers had limited stocks 
of grains, and local markets were in short supply (China 
Table 2. Impacts of the 2009–2010 severe droughts in China
2009 Spring Droughta 2009 Summer Droughtb 2010 Spring Droughtc
Difficulty in access to drinking 
water (million)
People  3.56  3.01 20.88
Livestock  0.96  5.22 13.68
Affected crops at the worst period 
(million ha)
Affected 10.13 10  6.73
Heavily affected  5.25  3.90 –
Major types of crops affected Winter wheat Maize, soybean, sorghum, 
grains
Spring grain crops and cash 
crops
Affected population (million) 87.31 28.64 61.31
Crops with yield loss (estimated) 
(million ha)
≥ 10% yield loss –  9.75  5.03
≥ 30% yield loss –  2.28  1.12
Direct economic losses (RMB billion Yuan†) – 22.87 23.66d
Note: †1 US Dollar = RMB 6.8 Yuan (approximately).
Data source: aNDRC-MCA 2009a; bNDRC-MCA 2009b; cSFDH 2010; dNDRC-MCA 2010.
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Daily 2010b). Data for the city of Chaoyang in Liaoning 
Province in September 2009 show that the population 
suffered from a grain shortage reached 1.38 million owing to 
the drought, out of the 3.43 million total population. The 
shortage of grains until the end of the year and the end of the 
following year was estimated to be 80,000 and 250,000 tons, 
respectively. 
At the macro level, the three droughts have not obviously 
affected the overall grain security in China. On the one hand, 
the actual yield decrease due to the droughts was a relatively 
small portion of the current annual grain production in China. 
On the other hand, with a sound grain reserve system estab-
lished, China can effectively cope with a grain yield reduction 
due to natural disasters so as to stabilize the market supply 
and spot prices and ensure grain security. During the 2009 and 
2010 droughts, the central government sent reserve grain to 
drought-stricken regions to alleviate local food shortages 
(Watts 2010) and successfully controlled the local grain price 
(Shi and Hu 2009). 
The aspirations of many local rural households were 
broken in the 2009 summer drought and 2010 spring drought. 
Most grain producers and herdsmen in the drought-afflicted 
districts received nothing from their investments. In the city 
of Chaoyang in Liaoning Province, the poverty-stricken 
population increased from 645,000 before the disaster to 1.54 
million afterward (EP-NDRCC 2009b). The disaster affected 
not only grain yield but also the production of other agricul-
tural products such as sugar cane, white mulberry, and coffee. 
The recovery of livelihoods is particularly challenging. The 
local people were encouraged to seek temporary job opportu-
nities in economically more developed cities far from home.
Severe damage also occurred to ecological systems and in 
a number of cases compromised medium term recovery 
efforts. According to the ecotone protection plan of China 
(Ministry of Environment Protection 2008), at least three 
ecotones were affected by the 2009 summer drought and 
2010 spring drought: the northern ecotone of agriculture and 
animal husbandry, the southwestern karst ecotone of stone 
desertification, and the southwestern mountainous ecotone of 
agriculture and animal husbandry. The long-lasting drought 
resulted in great damage to and even drying up of vegetation 
(forest, bush, and grass). The damage to vegetation exacer-
bates grassland degradation in mixed agriculture and animal 
husbandry zones, further worsening wind erosion and 
sandstorms in the northern part and soil-water loss in the 
southwestern part of China. In the Karst econtone, the 
damage to vegetation accelerates stone desertification, which 
is extremely difficult to recover particularly by natural 
process.
3.1.3 Drought Disaster Chain
Although the major impacts are listed above separately, their 
interlinkages are worth noting. To explore the causal relation-
ships among different types of impact, the concept of the 
drought disaster chain is employed. A disaster chain is a 
structured series of events, including direct or indirect 
impacts of a hazard or primary or secondary disasters induced 
by a primary hazard (Shi 2003). The structure of a disaster 
chain is in most cases like that of a tree, with one or two nodes 
representing the primary hazard (root) and a group of nodes 
representing direct and indirect impacts/primary and second-
ary disasters. Nodes without children nodes are leaf nodes. 
Nodes are connected with links (arrows), showing the causal 
(triggering) relationship between each pair of direct and 
indirect impacts, or primary and secondary disasters. The 
complete path from the root to a leaf node following the 
direction of links is called a chain, and all the chains woven 
together form a disaster tree. Different from the standard 
tree structure, there are generally alternative paths between a 
given pair of root and leaf nodes, and therefore, several chains 
can be parallel to each other. 
The disaster chains for each of the three drought disasters 
of 2009 and 2010 are derived through diagnostic analysis 
according to the field survey reports (EP-NDRCC 2009a, 
2009b, 2010). The links among primary, secondary, and even 
tertiary impacts applicable to each drought case are connected 
and structured in Figure 2. The starting point of the chain is 
drought, and there are five ends (leafs), including ecological 
security and food security problems. There are direct and 
indirect impacts at different levels between the start and ends, 
with links indicating the causal relationship between each 
pair of nodes. The hierarchy of the disaster chain is shown 
with the dashed gray lines: impacts of the same level are con-
nected with such line. The nodes and structure of the disaster 
chains differ in each case, showing the regional variation in 
the development of drought impacts in China. For instance, 
the disaster chain for the 2009 spring drought is the simplest 
among the three, consisting of only two chains: (1) drought 
→ water shortage → vegetation damage → grain crop failure 
and (2) drought → water shortage → drinking water security 
problem. 
It is important to know the typical structure of the disaster 
chain for a certain type of hazard for a specific region and 
time. Disaster risk reduction measures for entry prevention 
and response during the time a disaster is taking place can 
benefit from the use of a disaster chain, which can provide 
valuable information about the transition mechanism from 
hazard to disaster. Meanwhile, risk assessment models can 
also be developed on the basis of the disaster chain structure 
by introducing a Bayesian network with probability and 
conditional probabilities (IHDP-IRG 2009). Discussions on 
the modeling of disaster chain are ongoing (for example, Shi 
et al. 2010; Helbing and Kuhnert 2003) and applications are 
expected to emerge. The crucial remaining work is to quan-
tify the disaster chain with conditional probabilities estimated 
for each link, and loss assessment for each node provided the 
existence of other simultaneous impacts. 
4 Exit Transitions
The nationwide, centralized, top-down response scheme 
employed for the large-scale freezing-rain and snow disaster 
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in early 2008 and the Wenchuan Earthquake on 12 May 2008 
(Shi and Liu 2009; Shi et al. 2009) was again adopted to 
respond to the three severe drought disasters in 2009–2010. 
This system is characterized by direct involvement of para-
mount leaders and a top-down system for actions. Drought 
response was promoted from the central government with 
decisions made at the SFDH, the overall coordinating govern-
ment agency among all drought disaster reduction-related 
ministries, including the Ministries of Land and Resources, 
Water Resources, Agriculture, Civil Affairs, Finance, Nationa l 
Development and Reform Commission, and China Meteoro-
logical Administration. Those ministries are members of 
the SFDH and are responsible for specific actions. A state 
of emergency was declared for each of the three droughts 
and resources (funds, equipment, technicians and experts, and 
other support sources) were mobilized accordingly. Drought 
mitigation resources were allocated to and used by local gov-
ernments, the coordinating hub at the local level. Besides the 
government departments, military forces were also mobilized 
to engage in drought mitigation activity through the Central 
Military Commission. 
4.1 Coping Activities
The chief principles for actions were human-focused and 
prioritized on saving lives over protecting production. Tem-
porary drinking water supply was considered the first priority. 
The supply of grains, cooking oil, meat, and vegetables in the 
local markets was secured and prices were kept normal. 
Drought relief for agricultural production (especially grain 
production) was organized and subsidized by the government 
because of the importance of basic food availability to overall 
food security. Secondary to this top priority, local govern-
ments provided off-farm income sources for producers with 
severe crop damage. Last but not least, efforts were devoted 
to reducing the damage to the regional ecological systems 
and preventing secondary emergencies such as the spread of 
infectious disease.
The Drought Resistant Regulations of the People’s Repub-
lic of China (Draft) was reviewed and adopted by the execu-
tive meeting of the State Council on 11 February 2009 at 
the height of the 2009 spring drought. The formal version 
(CPG-PRC 2009) was officially promulgated on 26 February. 
The regulation specifies the duties of the government at all 
levels, defines a series of rules for major drought control, and 
specifies the assurance mechanism.
Beyond the efforts of the government, the mass media and 
citizens also played important roles. All major news media 
printed special headlines on drought control and disaster 
relief. Nationwide voluntary donations raised hundreds of 
millions of RMB Yuan for relief activities in each of the two 
spring droughts. Additionally, in the 2010 spring drought, 
drinking water was donated and delivered to people in the 
affected areas. 
4.2 Achievements in the Exit Transitions
With the centralized top-down approach, tens of millions of 
people were involved in the mitigation of each drought 
together with other inputs (Figure 3). Specific inputs include 
the mobilization of people and the army, allocation of 
special funds, setting up water diversion projects, and sending 
Figure 2. Disaster chains for the 2009–2010 severe droughts in China. The dashed gray lines connect impacts of the same 
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different equipments including motor-pumps and vehicles 
to the heavily affected regions. The purpose was to provide 
subsistence water supply to people and livestock by distant 
transport or exploiting locally available groundwater sources.
The comparison between the drought impact at the hardest 
time and the final loss indicates that the response was largely 
successful. First, temporary drinking water supply was made 
available in a timely manner and there were no known deaths 
reported due to a lack of drinking water or ill-conditioned 
water quality. Second, the quick response saved large areas of 
crops. In 2009, the nationwide harvest of summer grain crops 
even increased slightly by 2.2 percent. This was the sixth 
consecutive year of national growth in grain yield due to 
the large harvest in unaffected regions, although the total 
yield was affected by the spring drought. Last but not least, 
appropriate response strategies guaranteed public order in 
the drought stricken provinces. There was no food shortage, 
famine, market disorder, or public security problems. 
5 Entry Transition Mechanisms
This section elaborates on further diagnostic comparison of 
drought cases in terms of the entry-transition mechanism of 
drought disasters for different regions of China. The question 
to address here is: which set of underlying factors triggered 
the three drought disasters and which factors hampered the 
exit process? The diagnosis benefits from the analysis of 
cross-scale dynamics and comparisons.
5.1 Balance of Local Water Resources
The four panels in Figure 4 provide an overview of the bench-
mark water resource balance in the drought affected regions 
of China. These maps cover only the central and eastern parts 
of the country since our discussion of the 2009–2010 droughts 
is limited to these affected areas. 
Figure 4a depicts the total water resources available in 
each province in central and eastern China. It is clear that in 
the droughts of 2009 the impacted central and northeast prov-
inces were extremely short of water resources when compared 
with those southwest provinces affected by the 2010 spring 
drought. This is due to the climate condition of China under 
which the Asia Monsoon brings rainfall seasonally to mainly 
the eastern and southern parts of the country. 
The mismatch between available water resources (Figure 
4a) and the water supply ability (Figure 4b) of provincial-
level administrative units reflects the huge difference in 
regional water conservancy facilities. In southwestern China, 
the existence of abundant water resources does not mean that 
the resources are readily available to use. Southwestern China 
is mainly a mountainous area and the topography makes 
it more difficult to construct water conservancy and water 
supply facilities. Meanwhile, in the region of the Yunnan–
Guizhou Plateau, water storage in reservoirs is problematic 
owing to the extensively developed karst landform. Our field 
survey showed that water is available in many places, but 
the water was too distant or too deep underground for local 
people to access (EP-NDRCC 2010). In contrast, medium-
sized rain-water harvesting systems in some villages greatly 
benefited the local people. 
Figure 4c displays the annual aggregate sown area for 
all types of crops. A comparison between Figure 4a and 
Figure 4c indicates that regions with less water resources bear 
a heavier burden of crop production in China. The situation 
was different before the shift in the spatial distribution of 
China’s grain production over the past four decades. Recent 
studies (for example, Liu, Yang, and Feng 2007; Lu and Mei 
2007) show that from the 1970s to 2000s, the proportion of 
grain produced in northern China increased from 52.5 to 58.9 
Figure 3. 2009–2010 Drought disaster response measures
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People involved (10 million) Army involved (million) 
Government spending (Billion RMB Yuan) Water diversion for irrigaon (millionn m3)
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Figure 4. Water resources, water supply and irrigation capacities, and arable land in China. The dashed ellipse delineates 
the region affected by the 2009 droughts and the solid circle delineates the area affected by the 2010 spring drought
Data source: (a) and (c) NBSC 2009a; (b) Wang and Zuo 2009; (d) Area with Efficient Irrigation 2009. 
percent. If the national average per capita grain consumption 
is taken as the criterion, regions with grain surplus changed 
from northeastern China, the Yangtze River Basin, and south-
ern China in the 1970s to northeastern China and North China 
in the 2000s, which are exactly the drought-stricken prov-
inces in the 2009 spring and summer droughts. Although there 
are many reasons for such change, urbanization and industri-
alization have been identified as the major driving forces of 
land-use change in southern and eastern China, changing the 
pattern of grain production nationwide (Tian and Wan 2000; 
Yang and Li 2000). As China has increased its agricultural 
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variability in precipitation during the growing seasons, the 
increased overall exposure has substantially elevated the 
chances of drought entry transition. 
Figure 4d shows the vulnerability of agricultural produc-
tion in terms of guaranteed water supply, as well as the 
efficiency of water usage. In China, crop production is either 
rainfed, or using regular or water-efficient irrigation systems. 
Rain-fed agriculture is highly vulnerable to adverse weather 
conditions because it relies entirely on precipitation for water. 
Irrigation can to some extent reduce the risk of water shortage 
but such system is very water-consuming. Given the same 
amount of water, water-efficient irrigation systems can 
irrigate a much larger area of crops and therefore further 
reduce the dependence on natural precipitation. North China 
has more arable land than the other two drought-affected 
regions in this study, and a higher percentage of irrigated 
land, as well as water-efficient irrigation facilities. However, 
water availability is low in the area. The North China Plain 
has considerable groundwater overexploitation—the estimate d 
annual usable groundwater amount is 1.8 billion m3, whereas 
the current annual exploitation amounts to 2.9 billion m3 (Shi 
et al. 2011). Although the percentage of effective irrigation 
area of the region exceeds 60 percent, when surface water 
dries up, there is also little groundwater to tap into. In con-
trast, agricultural production in southwestern China relies too 
much on rainfall, and it requires urgent improvement of the 
irrigation system for guaranteed and efficient water supply. 
5.2 Local Economic Conditions
In China, the profit margin of grain crop production is small 
because the market price is low due to the intervention of the 
Chinese government. In the 2009 spring drought area, farm-
ers were richer than those in the 2009 summer drought and 
2010 spring drought areas. For instance, the annual per capita 
income of rural population is 5419.67, 4937.80, and 3369.34 
Yuan in Heibei, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan (NBSC 2010b). 
The proportion of farmers’ off-farm employment income for 
the three regions is 41.5, 18.2, and 20.3 percent, respectively. 
Therefore, winter wheat was of less priority to most rural 
households in the 2009 spring drought area. Wheat produc-
tion was more for self-sufficiency of staple food than the 
main source of income. This had two major consequences 
(Figure 5). At the beginning of winter 2008, there was insuf-
ficient pre-winter field preparation by most local farmers 
including pre-winter watering and soil-compacting, which 
resulted in water deficiency in the top soil layer (Jia et al. 
2009). This substantially increased the crops’ likelihood to 
suffer from drought and made the entry transition into severe 
drought impacts more likely to take place. When the drought 
occurred and the imbalance between water supply and 
demand materialized, many local households chose not to 
irrigate their crops, simply because the cost of such effort 
would have been higher than the potential gain from the 
harvest (EP-NDRCC 2009a; Niu 2009). Consequently, 
serious crop failure should have occurred if the Chinese 
government had not provided a considerable drought relief 
subsidy to local farmers.
It is worth noting that drought disaster is included in 
Figure 6 even though local livelihoods are to some extent 
insensitive to crop failure because households have diversi-
fied sources of income and the gain from farming constitutes 
only a small portion of their total income. The question is: if 
local households are insensitive to the loss from crop failure 
then why is the drought regarded as a disaster? This is 
answered by recalling the drought disaster chains as depicted 
in Figure 2. Beyond the immediate impact of grain crop fail-
ure on food availability and income (poverty) of individual 
households, along the drought disaster chain a second link 
relates crop failure to regional food security problems. The 
drought-stricken regions are the major winter wheat produc-
ing area of China. Although diversified income enables 
local households to withstand the temporary income shocks 
induced by drought, the severe drought caused serious reduc-
tion in regional winter wheat production. Therefore, it was 
not a disaster in terms of individual households’ food and 
income but was one in terms of overall grain production and 
food security. 
In contrast, in the villages hit by the 2009 summer drought 
and 2010 spring drought, the rural family income structure 
was relatively simple and the proportion of agricultural 
revenue (including crops and livestock) was high. For exam-
ple, this number was 67.6 percent in Yunnan and 66.3 percent 
in Inner Mongolia (NBSC 2010b). At the beginning of the 
seasons, without any awareness of the coming droughts, 
farmers invested a large proportion of their capital stock into 
crop production. When the droughts occurred, they had too 
limited resources (including water resources, motor-pumps, 
irrigation facilities, and other infrastructure) at hand to 
cope, even though they were exceptionally motivated. These 
are completely different cases (Figure 6) compared to the 
previous one. Thus there is a vicious cycle of being vulnera-
ble because of limited resources and coping measures and 
increasing poverty due to disasters, which is the so-called 






















Figure 5. Disaster mechanism of the 2009 spring drought in 
North China
Source: Adapted from EP-NDRCC 2009a and Jia et al. 2009.
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2005). Compared with the 2009 spring drought, crop failure 
in these two cases induced both rural household poverty and 
regional food security problems.
6 Discussion and Policy 
Recommendations
The Chinese government spent substantial funds on drought 
relief (Figure 3), bringing about considerable achievements 
(Table 3). The decision by the Chinese government to relieve 
drought disaster at all costs was appreciated when severe 
drought disasters were happening. The government made 
every effort to allocate resources to ensure adequate drinking 
water supply was available and food security existed (includ-
ing both crop production and local market supply in the 
drought-stricken areas). These decisions saved lives, ensured 
food security, and eased post-disaster recovery. Nevertheless, 
by examining both entry and exit transitions together, particu-
larly the former, it can hardly be claimed that the Chinese 
strategy of drought management was completely successful.
6.1 Entry and Exit Trade-Off
The government budget may be spent on entry-prevention 
measures such as adjusting the land-use pattern, improving 
infrastructure, or developing drought-resistant crops, which 
can lower the probability of disasters being triggered by 
hazards; or on exit-acceleration activities like rapid and coor-
dinated response and smooth recovery of livelihoods, which 
can substantially relieve direct and indirect impacts of a 
drought disaster. Instead of spending on disaster relief after a 
disaster has actually occurred, investing in entry-prevention 
measures is also important, and sometimes it could be more 
cost-efficient. In China’s case, RMB 22.5 billion Yuan gov-
ernment spending is needed annually until 2020 to improve 
90 percent of its rural water facilities (including both drinking 
water and irrigation water systems), if the central government 
is to share half of the burden for investment (China Irrigation 
and Drainage Develop Center and Center for Rural Drinking 
Water Safety, Ministry of Water Resources 2009). The actual 
subsidy from the central government to the water develop-
ment project was RMB 3 billion Yuan in 2008. In contrast, the 
total government spending in response to the three drought 
disasters added up to nearly RMB 8 billion Yuan (Figure 4). 
What if more government budget is used for entry preven-
tion? Would a better result, a more comprehensive drought 
risk reduction be achieved? The key to the optimal structure 
of such government spending is a sound cost-benefit analysis. 
It could either focus on the benefit of one unit of extra govern-
ment spending in terms of disaster entry prevention or exit 
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Figure 6. Disaster mechanism of the 2010 spring drought
Table 3. Drought disaster mitigation achievements
2009 Spring Drought 2009 Summer Drought 2010 Spring Drought
Temporary drinking water supply 1.76 million people 1.50 million peoplea 20.88 million peoplec
0.54 million livestock 0.89 million livestocka –
Crops irrigated (million ha) 12.4 3.1b 2.1c
Crops saved (million ha) 5.57 5.1b –
Crop harvestd A nationwide increment of 2.2% A nationwide reduction of 0.6%, 
2.3 million tons
A nationwide reduction of 0.8%, 
0.4 million tons
Data source: aSFDH 2009; bXinhua News Agency 2009; cSFDH 2010; dNBSC 2009b, 2010a.
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reduction. Opportunity cost in government expenditure must 
be addressed and the difficulty in the analysis is how to eval-
uate and quantify social-ecological benefits besides economic 
benefits. Benefits for social, institutional, and ecological sub-
systems must be taken into account. These benefits include 
but are not limited to the stability of social order, addressing 
humanitarian concerns, and the maintenance of ecological 
service and good environment conditions.
6.2 Strengthen Entry-Prevention Strategies
There is a clear concentration of people and agricultural 
production that exceeds regional water supply capacity in 
many regions of China, either due to the low availability 
of water resources or inadequate water storage and delivery 
infrastructure. National and regional macro land-use planning 
has to ensure food security and ecological and environmental 
security, and reduce natural disaster risks. Grain production 
should again be concentrated in those regions with favorable 
environmental conditions, including good soil, water, and 
landform conditions. The burden of crop production in 
northern China could be reduced by increasing production in 
southern China, mainly in the Yangtze River Basin. In regions 
with vulnerable ecological environments and subjected to 
frequent disasters, for example, the northern ecotone of agri-
culture and animal husbandry and southwestern hilly regions, 
it is much preferable to grow fewer grain crops but more 
vegetation with higher ecological value since different types 
of ecosystems serve to maintain eco-environment quality 
differently (Costanza et al. 1997). The country should 
continue to implement, on a large scale, the project of “Grain 
for Green” (Uchida, Xu, and Rozelle 2003), and further 
strengthen its support for the development of animal hus-
bandry. A long-term compensatory mechanism needs to be 
established for those who lose their opportunities of income 
from cropping.
Better control over and more efficient use of limited water 
resources is central to any drought mitigation policy. Key 
water conservancy projects are still needed in some parts 
of China to better buffer seasonal and annual precipitation 
fluctuations. Such projects may allow both flood control 
and drought relief. In rural areas, it is of higher priority to 
construct small- and medium-sized water-harvesting projects. 
Meanwhile, water-efficient irrigation facilities should be 
widely adopted and water-efficient agriculture is required to 
conserve water resources. The average irrigation water 
use efficiency in China was 48.3 percent in 2008 (China 
Irrigation and Drainage Develop Center and Center for Rural 
Drinking Water Safety, Ministry of Water Resources 2009), 
almost 20 percentage points below that in developed coun-
tries. In this sense, there is a great potential for the improve-
ment of the quality of life for the Chinese people through 
consuming even less water should this gap be bridged.
Improving the resilience of local communities at risk 
to drought shocks is of paramount importance. As the first 
priority, a safe drinking-water supply system should be 
provided to an additional 100 million rural residents in China. 
Secondly, rural household livelihood structure ought to be 
changed to be more resilient to natural disaster impacts. The 
government may further increase the grain acquisition price 
so that producers have a larger profit margin and greater 
incentive to manage their crops. A more diversified livelihood 
system ought to be established and the proportion of crop 
revenue in a household’s total income must be reduced. For 
instance, local people should be encouraged to seasonally 
migrate to larger cities to seek for temporary job opportuni-
ties. The government should provide preliminary training to 
these fresh workers so that they can get a job more easily. 
For those rural households whose income is sensitive to 
weather events, crop insurance coverage should contribute 
more to reducing income fluctuation induced by weather. In 
the case of farmers who have lost capital for purchasing seeds, 
fertilizer, and pesticide, microcredit, government subsidies, 
or preferential loans may be of great assistance for recovery.
6.3 Exit Smoothing Actions: Improving 
Inter-Departmental Coordination and Strengthen the 
Role of the Market
Drought exit transitions would improve if interdepartmental 
coordination was strengthened. In the three droughts studied, 
a state of emergency was announced to mobilize resources 
and promote relief activities. But multiple announcements 
were made by different government agencies with completely 
different criteria. In China, SFDH, MCA, and other relevant 
government departments all have their own schemes for 
declaring an emergency and their classifications of levels of 
emergency differ. 
At SFDH, an emergency is defined according to the State 
Emergency Response Scheme for Flood Control and Drought 
Relief (CPG-PRC 2006) and the criteria are based on the 
number of provinces/cities having a certain percentage of the 
population experiencing drinking-water supply problem 
and the proportion of crops for which there is a shortage of 
irrigation water. The MCA reacts according to the Emergency 
Action Manual for Natural Disaster Relief of the MCA (CPG-
PRC 2011) and the standard is the size of the population in 
need of drinking water and food aid from the government. 
The CMA has its own classification system based on a metro-
logical drought index. The MOA (Ministry of Agriculture) 
also has an emergency plan for agricultural drought. During 
the droughts of 2009 and 2010, the above government agen-
cies announced various levels of emergencies at different 
times and in an inconsistent manner, even though they are all 
members of the SFDH. Apparently, their actions were hardly 
coordinated and the effectiveness of the emergency response 
was undermined. 
An upgraded public-private partnership could enhance the 
effectiveness of the integrated disaster risk transfer system. 
The government-sponsored crop insurance program (Wang 
et al. 2011) did not contribute much to post-drought liveli-
hood recovery in the three drought cases. In the 2009 spring 
drought, RMB 260 million Yuan was paid to approximately 
one million wheat producers in seven provinces, with 120 
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million of the payment sent to Anhui Province alone (Tong 
2009). In the 2009 summer drought, insurance companies 
in total paid out RMB 1.95 billion Yuan in Inner Mongolia, 
Liaoning, and Jilin Provinces, covering 3.47 million ha of 
crops—about half of the affected cropland area in these 
places. The situation was the worst for the 2010 spring drought 
due to the lack of government subsidies and insurance 
products.
Several issues are attributed to this unsatisfactory situa-
tion, including Chinese crop producers’ perception of crop 
insurance and inadequate attractiveness of the current insur-
ance coverage (Zhou 2010). Drought is a peril that is not 
included in the basic combo coverage, in which flood, hail, 
strong wind, and freezing are included. Farmers can purchase 
drought insurance only when a special insurance policy is 
provided by the insurance company. There is thus a gap 
between demand and supply. Government subsidies are 
one way to cope temporarily with such a gap, by providing 
incentives to and increasing awareness of potential policy 
holders. But its side effect of distorting the market and limited 
efficiency reduces the efficacy of such subsidies.
In order to allow crop insurance to play a more significant 
role in post-disaster recovery of livelihood, China will need 
an integrated risk transfer system, synthesis of a number of 
financial instruments based on an independent and objective 
risk quantification and capital allocation. The first priority 
for China is to improve risk assessment through modeling 
of natural hazards with catastrophic potential. An objective 
and convincing loss-exceedance probability curve can allow 
policyholders, insurers and reinsurers, regulatory agencies, 
and the government to have a clear picture about the true cost 
of risk transfer, and develop hazard risk insurance schemes 
tailored for the actual situation of rural China.
Several issues require emphasis in the primary insurance 
layer. First, the design of a crop insurance program should 
incorporate incentive mechanisms to promote producer-level 
disaster prevention and relief activities. An optimal crop 
insurance program could help achieve risk reduction in 
crop production when the transfer of producers’ income risk 
is accomplished. The second issue is the promotion of public-
private partnerships. The government should maintain pro-
vincial and central catastrophe reserves, which can be used to 
directly cap peak losses for primary insurers or provide them 
excess-of-loss reinsurance (Cummins, Lewis, and Phillips 
1995). Meanwhile, subsidies should also be delivered to 
insurers because the transaction cost in China is substantially 
high (Wang et al. 2011), taking into account current agricul-
tural practice in China. Last but not least, index-based 
crop insurance may partially solve the problem, as in many 
developing countries (Ibarra and Skees 2007; United Nations 
2007). 
7 Conclusion
From late 2008 through the second quarter of 2010, there 
were severe droughts in China with a return period of once in 
a hundred years in some regions. The hazards affected large 
populations, caused heavy agricultural losses, and had deep 
and long-term socioeconomic impacts in some areas, includ-
ing the local poverty problem. The response from the Chinese 
government was well organized, and basically successful. 
With broad public support, Chinese society completed the 
exit transition smoothly, and people’s lives and livestock were 
saved. But there is still a considerable room for both public 
and private sectors to perform better in the exit transition, 
including addressing the interagency coordination deficien-
cies in the top-down disaster response system and upgrading 
the weak performance of crop insurance. 
The entry-transition mechanisms of the three disasters 
were completely different due to their regional differences. In 
northern China, limited water resources were overstretched 
by pre-drought regional socioeconomic activities, especially 
agricultural production. This made the region vulnerable 
to variability in precipitation. In contrast, there are plenty of 
water resources in southwestern China, but the landform and 
geological conditions make it extremely difficult for some 
villages to access surface water. Local household income 
structures also shape different entry-transition mechanisms. 
Owing to the low profitability of grain cropping, proper 
field preparation and irrigation were sometimes neglected, 
increasing the risk of soil water deficiency and crop failure. 
Poor rural households had even fewer resources to cope with 
a severe and extended drought. 
In the context of global environmental change there are 
data and projections indicating that China can experience 
more severe droughts in the near future (Song et al. 2005; Tao 
et al. 2006; Zhai et al. 1999; Cruz et al. 2007). Change in the 
environment at a global scale cannot be dealt with by a single 
region and in a relatively short time span. The only option 
is to build the resilience and adaptivity of our SES so that 
it is more capable of withstanding adverse environmental 
changes. This would result in a robust system with a high 
threshold before tipping over into a disaster state and with 
high resilience so that the SES can exit a disaster state more 
quickly and smoothly. The essential purpose of an entry and 
exit study is to find the way to change individual and societal 
behavior appropriately, that is, to “adapt.” The adjustment 
of land-use pattern, restructuring of people’s income and 
livelihoods, and improvement of government management of 
drought risk through a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis 
on entry-prevention and exit-acceleration approaches, for 
example, are all ways toward a successful adaptation. 
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